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1. Introduction 
     In international economics, the ‘gravity equation’ has been considered to be the 
most powerful empirical tool for investigating the determinants of bilateral trade values. 
The traditional gravity equation has a log of bilateral trade as a dependent variable as 
well as logs of importer’s and exporter’s GDPs and a log of distance between trading 
partners as independent variables. Its estimation always presents us with an excellent 
empirical fit. Relying on such properties, a large number of scholars have employed the 
gravity equation for the investigation of bilateral trade. It can be used for clarifying the 
causes of growth of world trade after the Second World War (Baier and Bergstrand 
2001). The impact of international agreements such as free trade agreements (FTAs) 
(Baier and Bergstrand 2007) and of international organizations such as the World Trade 
Organization (Rose 2004) on trade can also be evaluated by the gravity equation. The 
development of these gravity papers proves the equation’s usefulness in empirical 
analysis. In addition, there are now a variety of the theoretical models supporting the 
gravity formulation (see, for example, Combes et al. 2008: 127). In short, a gravity 
equation is a powerful tool from both the theoretical and empirical points of view. 
     However, no studies heretofore have included the most important economic 
variable in international economics, bilateral tariff rates, in the gravity equation. The 
study of international economics belongs to regional economics, but an important 
difference between it and other fields in regional economics such as urban economics is 
that the boundaries of the regions are national borders, not city borders or state borders. 
Thus, in international economics, theoretical models show that transactions across 
regional boundaries require firms to incur ‘trade costs.’ In particular, in contrast to other 
fields in regional economics, trade costs in international economics include not only 
physical transport costs but also policy-related costs, namely, tariff and non-tariff 
barriers. So, tariff rates are the most important economic variable in international 
economics in terms of the differentiation with other fields in regional economics. In 
spite of such importance, the gravity studies in international economics have never 
included time-variant trading pair-specific tariff rates. This means that our previous 
estimators in gravity may suffer from serious omitted-variable biases: if any elements 
affecting bilateral tariff rates are related to other gravity variables, the coefficients for 
those variables suffer from biases due to the omission of the tariff rates. 
     The obvious reason for such omission of bilateral tariff rates in the gravity 
analysis lies in the data availability. Countries have several kinds of tariff duty and levy 
different kinds of duty on each trading partner country. The major kinds of tariff duty 
include most-favored nation (MFN) rates, generalized system of preferences (GSP) 
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rates, and FTA preferential rates. Based on whether trading partners are members of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), are developing countries, and/or share membership 
in the same FTA, we need to classify each trading partner’s applied tariff schemes. Thus, 
what we firstly need to do is to collect all kinds of tariff duty information for each 
country. Although each country reports this information, worldwide collection of it has 
presented a huge task. Even if we successfully collected such data, we then would need 
to carry out the above-mentioned classification of tariff schemes according to trading 
partners. In short, although tariff rates are the most important variable in international 
economics, measures of them are also one of the most difficult measures to construct. 
     Recently, there have been some efforts toward the construction of a database of 
tariff rates. As listed in Bouet et al. (2005), several databases of tariff rates exist: 
Hemispheric Database by Inter-American Development Bank; Integrated Database 
(IDB) by the WTO; Integrated Tariff Analysis System (ITAS) by the Australian 
Government Productivity Commission; MAcMap by the Centre d’Informations 
Internationales (CEPII); and Trade Analysis and Information System (TRAINS) by the 
United Nations Conference on Trade And Development (UNCTAD). In particular, the 
World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) 1  is now the most powerful software 
developed by the World Bank, UNCTAD, International Trade Center (ITC), United 
Nations Statistical Division (UNSD), and WTO. This database includes tariff, 
para-tariff, and non-tariff measures at the national tariff line level by origin for more 
than 200 countries. In short, the above-mentioned difficulties in constructing bilateral 
tariff data could be overcome by employing this database. It is expected that this 
database will become the major data source for tariff data in international economics. 
     In this paper, using the worldwide dataset of bilateral tariff rates drawn from the 
WITS, we explore how serious the omission of bilateral tariff rates in gravity is. 
Specifically, we firstly examine how coefficients for other variables such as 
geographical distance change before and after the introduction of bilateral tariff rates. 
That is, we explore how large the biases from the omission of bilateral tariff rates are. 
Secondly, we investigate whether or not the inclusion of a dummy variable for regional 
trade agreement (RTA) plays an alternative role by representing the inclusion of 
bilateral tariff rates. Compared with the bilateral tariff rates, it is easy to construct the 
RTA dummy, which takes unity if two countries are members of the same RTA and 
zero otherwise. Indeed, one of the crucial sources for heterogeneous tariff rates across 
trading partners is the existence of RTA. If the simple one-zero RTA dummy, which has 
been included in some of the previous studies in gravity, is able to explain most of the 
                                                  
1 http://wits.worldbank.org/WITS/ 
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variation in bilateral tariff rates, the inclusion of the RTA dummy will account for the 
omission of bilateral tariff rates. In place of RTA dummy variables, we also attempt to 
include some kinds of fixed effects to examine whether or not those fixed effects could 
play an alternative role by representing bilateral tariff rates. 
     The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents an 
overview of bilateral tariff rates around the world. In Section 3, we estimate several 
gravity equations, and Section 4 examines the seriousness of the omission of bilateral 
tariff rates in gravity. In Section 5, the conclusion of this paper is presented. 
 
 
2. Bilateral Tariff Rates 
     This section presents an overview of manufacturing tariff rates around the world. 
Our data source for tariff rates is the WITS, particularly TRAINS raw data. In addition, 
some other sources are used for identifying exact tariff schemes for each trading 
partner.2 In particular, we needed to make a list of member countries in the WTO and 
in each RTA. Also, the GSP beneficiaries are different across importers. The 
information regarding the WTO and RTA is obtained from the WTO website. We used 
the ‘Regional Trade Agreements Information System’ for obtaining the member list of 
each RTA.3 As for the GSP beneficiaries, we used several documents available on the 
UNCTAD website in addition to official documents on the website of national customs 
agencies in each country.4 Notice that we take into account only GSP beneficiaries 
which can be identified in these documents. While the lists of beneficiary countries are 
commonly available for one specific year in each country, the beneficiary countries may 
change over time, i.e., they may graduate from being GSP beneficiaries. Therefore, we 
may undercount/overcount GSP beneficiaries. 
     It is further worth noting three points. Firstly, a different version of the 
Harmonized System (HS) is used depending on the year in each country. In order to 
construct a tariff database comparable across years, we convert all HS versions 
(HS1996, HS2002, and HS2007) to HS1992 using the HS conversion tables available at 
the UNSD.5 As a result, our background database of bilateral tariff rates is constructed 
                                                  
2 We assume that all firms use the tariff schemes with the lowest rates, though some firms may be 
forced to use the higher general tariff rates such as MFN rates because it is necessary to incur some 
kinds of fixed costs for the use of preferential tariff schemes (Demidova and Krishna 2008).  
3 http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx 
4 http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=1418&lang=1 
5  
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/trade/conversions/HS%20Correlation%20and%20Conversion%20tables.ht
m 
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at the 6-digit level of HS1992. Secondly, we put the most recent past rates available into 
missing data. For example, if tariff data are missing in 2000 and 2001 during the period 
of 1996-2006, we use the rates in 1999 for rates in 2000 and 2001. Thirdly, we treat 
non-ad valorem tariff rates simply as missing. Also, for simplicity, we use the lower 
rates for mix tariff rates, though these treatments underestimate tariff rates to some 
extent.  
     We aggregate 6-digit level tariff rates into a single tariff rate for the 
manufacturing industry by the using the simple average of 6-digit level manufactured 
products. The manufacturing industry includes Sectors 2 to 4 of the CPC provisional 
classification6 using the conversion table for HS1992, available on the website of 
UNSD.7 Our focus on the manufacturing industry obviously decreases the magnitude of 
the above-mentioned underestimation because non-ad valorem tariff rates and mix tariff 
rates are mostly set in non-manufacturing industries. As a result, our database of 
bilateral tariff rates in the manufacturing industry is a completely-balanced panel dataset 
for 94 countries (see Appendix) and 11 years (1996-2006).  
Let us start by examining two figures. The average of bilateral tariff rates in all 
sample pairs is depicted in Figure 1, which shows a steady decrease from 1996 to 2006. 
The rates decreased by half, from 14% in 1996 to 7% in 2006. Figure 2 shows the 
ranking of the average bilateral tariff rates in each importing country in 2006. More than 
a half of the sample countries have average tariff rates of less than 10%. The 
well-known champions of openness are ranked first, namely Hong Kong, Singapore, 
and Switzerland, followed by the member counties of the European Union (EU). 
Countries that rank third in openness include high income countries, such as Japan, the 
USA, and oil countries (e.g., Brunei and Saudi Arabia). The less developed countries are 
also less open countries in terms of bilateral tariff rates. 
 
===   Figures 1&2   === 
 
     Table 1 shows the inter- and intra-continental/regional tariff rates in 1996 and 
2006. Taking a look at intra-regional tariff rates, i.e., ‘Within Region,’ we see three 
noteworthy points. Firstly, Europe and the Pacific regions have had rather low tariff 
rates (however, notice that the Pacific region consists of only two countries in our 
sample). Particularly in 2006, those regions had tariff rates of less than 1%. Secondly, 
                                                  
6 Sector 2 is food products, beverages and tobacco as well as textiles, apparel and leather products; 
Section 3 is other transportable goods, except metal products, machinery and equipment; Sector 4 is 
metal products, machinery and equipment. 
7 http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regdnld.asp?Lg=1 
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while the intra-regional tariff rates in Asia were the highest (21%) among the five 
regions, those rates dramatically dropped to 8% in 2006, which is almost the same level 
as those in America. Some reasons for this dramatic drop may be the acceleration of 
tariff reduction in the ASEAN Free Trade Area, China’s admittance to the WTO, several 
FTAs concluded among oil countries, and so on. 
 
===   Table 1   === 
 
     The inter-regional tariff rates are also reported in Table 1. The column ‘To 
Outside Region’ reports the tariff rates applied when each region exports to the outside. 
Countries in Europe and the Pacific have needed to pay much higher tariff rates when 
exporting to the outside than when exporting to intra-regional countries. On the other 
hand, African countries have had better access to outside countries than to intra-regional 
countries. In 2006, there is little gap in America and Asia between inter-regional access 
and intra-regional access. The column ‘From Outside Region’ indicates the tariff rates 
applied to countries outside of each region. In this column, we can see a ‘regional 
block’: inter-regional tariff rates are higher than intra-regional tariff rates. However, the 
magnitude of the gap between those kinds of tariff rates is trivial, at only 1% to 2%.  
 
 
3. Gravity 
     In international economics, it is well known that a gravity equation is one of the 
most successful tools for quantitatively analyzing bilateral merchandise trade patterns. 
The traditional gravity equation has logs of the importer’s and exporter’s GDPs and a 
log of distance between trading partners: 
ln Tij = β0 + β1 ln GDPi + β2 ln GDPj + β3 ln Distanceij + εij, 
where Tij represents bilateral goods exports of country i to country j. Its estimation 
always presents us with an excellent empirical fit. Relying on such properties, a large 
number of scholars have employed the gravity equation for the investigation of bilateral 
trade. This gravity equation is often extended as follows: 
ln Tij = β0 + β1 ln GDPi + β2 ln GDPj + β3 ln Distanceij + β4 Contingencyij  
+ β5 Languageij + β6 Colonyij + εij.   (1) 
Contingency takes unity if two countries share the national border and zero otherwise. 
Language is a dummy variable taking unity if a language is spoken by at least 9% of the 
population in both countries and zero otherwise. Colony takes unity if two countries had 
colonial relationship in the past and zero otherwise. 
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It is well known that this gravity equation can be supported by various kinds of 
theoretical models. Anderson (1979) and Bergstrand (1985, 1989), in which gravity 
models are based on the Armington assumption (1969), are amongst the classics. 
Subsequently, it has been shown that the gravity equation can be derived from many 
different models, including the Ricardian (Eaton and Kortum 2002), Heckscher–Ohlin 
(Deardorff 1998), and monopolistic competition models (Helpman and Krugman 1985). 
In particular, under the usual assumptions in horizontal differentiation models (e.g., 
CES utility function), Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) derive the following gravity 
equation (equation 9 on page 175): 






1
ji
ij
W
ji
ij P
t
y
yy
x ,                         (2) 
where 
       111j jjiji Pt ,         111i iiijj tP , and Wjj yy . 
xij, yi, tij, and yW are the nominal value exports from countries i to j, total income of 
country i, iceberg trade costs from countries i to j, and world nominal income, 
respectively. σ denotes the elasticity of substitution among varieties. Π and P are price 
indices and are also called ‘multilateral resistance’ terms. 
Taking logs in equation (2), we obtain: 
      jiijjiWij Ptyyyx ln1ln1ln1lnlnlnln   . 
The usual assumption is that trade costs t are log-linear to geographical distance, 
linguistic commonality, colonial relationship, and border contingency; 
       4321 expexpexptanexp 0  ijijijijij ColonyLanguageyContingencceDist  . 
Then, this equation can be rewritten as: 
ln Tij = β0 + β1 ln GDPi + β2 ln GDPj + β3 ln Distanceij + β4 Contingencyij  
+ β5 Languageij + β6 Colonyij + β7 ln Πi + β8 ln Pj + εij.   (3) 
GDP is used as a proxy for y. Compared with the traditional equation (1), this 
theory-based equation includes multilateral resistance terms, namely ln Πi and ln Pj. In 
order to control these terms, we follow the method proposed by Feenstra (2002), which 
replaces multilateral resistance variables with importer and exporter dummies. Thus, the 
equation to be usually estimated can be shown as: 
ln Tij = β0 + β3 ln Distanceij + β4 Contingencyij + β5 Languageij  
+ β6 Colonyij + ui + uj + εij.    (4) 
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The inclusion of importer and exporter dummy variables forces us to drop importer and 
exporter GDPs. 
     However, we do not have any convincing empirical evidence that trade costs do 
not depend on bilateral tariff rates. Since tariff rates are not identical all over the world, 
and furthermore, not importer-specific, the constant term and importer fixed effects do 
not take care of the omission of tariff rates at all. In short, in the usual gravity estimation, 
bilateral tariff rates are included in the error term. Therefore, if unobservable shocks to 
bilateral tariff rates are also related to other gravity variables, their coefficients are 
biased. For example, developed countries might be likely to give GSP status to 
countries with a colonial relationship. In order to check the magnitude of such biases, 
we naturally assume that trade costs depend further on bilateral tariff rates; 
         ijijijijijij TariffColonyLanguageyContingencceDist  1expexpexptanexp 43210  . 
Then, the gravity equation is given by: 
ln Tij = β0 + β3 ln Distanceij + β4 Contingencyij + β5 Languageij  
+ β6 Colonyij + β9 ln (1+Tariffij) + ui + uj + εij.    (5) 
Comparing the estimated coefficients between (4) and (5), we investigate how serious 
the omission of bilateral tariff rates is in the gravity estimation. 
We estimate the above-listed gravity equations for manufacturing trade among 94 
countries during 1996-2006. Our data sources are as follow. The bilateral trade values 
are obtained from the UN Comtrade. As in the case of tariff rates, we examine bilateral 
trade in the manufacturing industry based on CPC provisional classification. Thus, 
bilateral trade values at 6-digit HS1992 level are aggregated to those in the 
manufacturing industry. In the recent literature on gravity, zero-valued trade is a hot 
issue. In our case, around 20% of the country pairs have zero-valued trade in the 
manufacturing industry. Although this is not a trivial amount, we drop those pairs for 
simplicity. However, the simple treatment of adding the value of one before taking a log 
does not change our estimation results presented in the next section.8 The data source 
for bilateral tariff rates is the same as in Section 2. The sources for Distance, 
Contingency, Language, and Colony are on the CEPII website.  
 
                                                  
8 The approach adopted in the recent literature for addressing this issue is the use of the method 
proposed by Silva and Tenreyro (2006) or Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008). While the 
former approach is the pseudo poisson maximum likelihood technique, the latter one is the extended 
technique of the Heckman two-step estimation. In this paper, we do not take this issue into account 
because it is difficult to obtain the convergence of log-likelihood in such maximum likelihood 
techniques for our model which includes three kinds of fixed effects (we will introduce uit, ujt, and 
uij) and a large number of countries and years.  
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4. Estimation Results 
     This section reports the estimation results of several gravity equations. The basic 
statistics and our baseline results are reported in Tables 2 and 3, respectively. Column 
(I) in Table 3 reports the results of equation (4), namely the gravity equations without 
tariff rates. All coefficients are significantly estimated with expected signs. The 
geographical distance between trading partners is negatively correlated with trade 
values. The linguistic commonality, colonial relationship, and sharing the national 
border encourage active trade between two countries. This model explains well the 
bilateral trade flows all over the world; adjusted R-squared registers more than 80%. 
These results are the same as the ones that we always obtained in previous studies. 
 
===   Tables 2 & 3   === 
      
In column (II), we include bilateral tariff rates in the gravity equation, i.e., 
equation (5). The coefficient for bilateral tariff rates is estimated to be significantly 
negative, as is consistent with our expectation. From the theoretical point of view 
underlying the gravity equation, as demonstrated in the previous section, its coefficient 
can be directly related to the elasticity of substitution among goods/varieties (σ). 
Specifically, it is equal to 1-σ. Thus, σ implied by our estimator becomes approximately 
5, which is a reasonable value in the literature.9 The results in the other variables are 
almost the same as those in column (I). In particular, the magnitude of coefficients for 
those variables does not change significantly. For example, the coefficient for Distance 
changes only from -1.613 to -1.596. Also, the adjusted R-squared does not experience a 
remarkable rise, compared with that in column (I). In short, while the bilateral tariff 
rates are important in terms of model specification because of their significant impacts 
on trade values, their omission seems to be not so serious in terms of biases in other 
gravity variables and in terms of of the empirical fit of the gravity model.  
     Next, we examine whether or not the inclusion of RTA dummy variables, which 
are easier to construct than bilateral tariff rates, makes the coefficient for bilateral tariff 
rates insignificant. The widely-used measure for RTAs is a one-zero RTA dummy, which 
takes unity if two countries are members of the same RTA and zero otherwise. If its 
inclusion makes the coefficient for the tariff rates insignificant, the omission of bilateral 
                                                  
9 Head and Ries (2001) and Hanson (2005) obtain estimates of σ ranging between 7 and 11 and 
between 5 and 8, respectively. As a result, Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) conclude that σ is 
likely to be in the range of 5 to 10. 
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tariff rates does not matter because the RTA dummy plays an alternative role in place of 
bilateral tariff rates. We construct the RTA dummy by using the list of RTAs provided on 
the WTO website under ‘The Regional Trade Agreements Information System,’ as used 
in Section 2. This list is based on notifications from the WTO member countries and 
provides data on both active and inactive (or vanished) RTAs. This implies that RTAs 
not reported to GATT/WTO are not incorporated into our dataset. Furthermore, while 
our RTA dummy includes RTAs reported under GATT Article XXIV as well as the 
Enabling Clause, RTAs reported under GATS Article V are excluded. 
The results of the simple introduction of a one-zero RTA dummy variable, which 
is one-year lagged, are reported in column (III). The coefficient for Tariff is still 
significantly negative, and its absolute magnitude drops remarkably due to the inclusion 
of the RTA dummy variable. The latter result implies that the variation of bilateral tariff 
rates is partly explained by the RTA dummy variable. The coefficient for RTA is also 
estimated to be significantly positive, as is consistent with our expectation. In column 
(IV), we introduce further lagged RTA dummy variables (five-year lagged and ten-year 
lagged) in order to take into account a ‘phase-in’ period in RTAs. However, the results 
are qualitatively unchanged, though the coefficient for the five-year lagged RTA dummy 
is estimated to be negatively significant. Compared with (I), these equations with RTA 
dummy variables have different absolute values in the coefficients for other standard 
gravity variables, particularly Distance, but these changes come from the inclusion of 
RTA dummy variables, not the inclusion of bilateral tariff rates, as confirmed in (II). 
Thus, RTA dummy variables may capture the more significant portion of trade creation 
effects than bilateral tariff rates. In other words, the omission of RTA dummy variables 
may be more serious than the omission of bilateral tariff rates in terms of biases in other 
gravity variables. 
In addition, we take into account the heterogeneity of RTAs to some extent as in 
Vicard (2009). Specifically, we decompose a simple RTA dummy variable into CU 
dummy (one for the same Customs Union members), FTA dummy (one for the same 
Free Trade Agreement members), and PTA dummy variables (one for the same 
Preferential Trade Agreement members).10 This decomposition is also possible with the 
information from the above-mentioned WTO website. The estimation results in this case 
are reported in column (V) and show again the negatively significant impacts of 
bilateral tariff rates on trade values. The Customs Union shows the largest trade creation 
effects, though the coefficient for FTA is estimated to be significantly negative. The 
                                                  
10 CU is defined in Paragraph 8(a) of Article XXIV of GATT 1994, FTA is defined in Paragraph 8(b) 
of Article XXIV of GATT 1994, and PTA is reported under paragraph 4(a) of the Enabling Clause. 
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coefficient for Contingency turns out to be insignificant. As a result, we can say that the 
omission of bilateral tariff rates does not yield serious biases in other standard gravity 
variables, but should be avoided because of their significant impacts on trade values. 
Lastly, we introduce time-invariant country pair fixed effects instead of RTA 
dummy variables. Then, time-invariant pair specific explanatory variables, i.e., all 
variables other than tariff rates, are dropped. The result is reported in column (I) in 
Table 4. Interestingly, the coefficient for Tariff turns out to be insignificant, though its 
sign is still negative. This insignificant result implies that a significant part of the 
impacts of bilateral tariff rates could be explained by time-invariant pair specific 
elements. The inclusion of some RTA dummy variables makes the result in bilateral 
tariff rates all the more insignificant, as found in columns (II)-(IV).11 In sum, if 
including time-varying exporter fixed effects, time-varying importer fixed effects, and 
time-invariant pair fixed effects, the omission of bilateral tariff rates in gravity equations 
does not matter at all because those fixed effects can play an alternative role in place of 
the tariff rates. 
 
===   Table 4   === 
      
This insignificant result in bilateral tariff rates might be reasonable because GSP 
status, WTO membership, and those tariff rates do not change so frequently, particularly 
during a period of about 10 years like our sample. As a result, those impacts are mostly 
controlled by time-invariant pair fixed effects. Even if the impacts of GSP and WTO 
membership are completely controlled, however, the variation of tariff rates through 
RTAs is still expected to have significant impacts on trade values. Thus, the 
insignificant results imply that RTAs do not explain a significant part of bilateral tariff 
rates. In order to confirm this hypothesis, we investigate to what degree the RTA 
dummy variables can explain the variation of bilateral tariff rates by regressing RTA 
                                                  
11 It is well known that the introduction of a time-invariant pair dummy also accounts for the 
endogeneity issue in RTA variables: elements having influence on international trade between them 
also affect the decision on the RTA conclusion (see Baier and Bergstrand 2004, 2007). Baier and 
Bergstrand (2007) closely examine this issue. One possible way of addressing the endogeneity is the 
use of instruments. Baier and Bergstrand (2007) tried a wide array of economic and political 
instrument variables. However, they conclude that the instrument variable method is not a reliable 
method because of the lack of suitable instruments. Most of the variables that are correlated 
cross-sectionally with the probability of having an RTA are also correlated cross-sectionally with 
trade flows. As a result, they demonstrate that the most plausible estimates of the RTA impacts on 
international trade are obtained from the gravity estimation using panel data with bilateral fixed 
effects. This estimation enables us to isolate the RTA impacts on bilateral international trade from 
any time-invariant country-pair-specific elements, some of which are related with the decision on the 
conclusion of the RTA and bilateral international trade. 
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dummy variables on bilateral tariff rates. The OLS results are reported in Table 5. 
Column (I) is the result for the simple equation including a simple one-year lagged RTA 
dummy. The coefficient for the RTA dummy is negatively significant. However, 
adjusted R-squared is just 0.01%, indicating that the simple RTA dummy does little to 
explain the variation of bilateral tariff rates. In columns (II) and (III), we introduce the 
further-lagged RTA dummy variables and the decomposed RTA dummy variables, 
respectively. Although some variables have unexpected signs, these RTA dummy 
variables could explain, at most, 10% of the variation of bilateral tariff rates. Thus, such 
trivial contribution by RTAs may yield the insignificant impacts of bilateral tariff rates 
when including time-invariant pair fixed effects. 
 
===   Table 5   === 
  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
     In this paper, using the worldwide dataset of bilateral tariff rates, we explore the 
seriousness of the omission of bilateral tariff rates in gravity. Two kinds of analyses 
were conducted. The first one was to explore how large the biases from the omission of 
bilateral tariff rates are. Secondly, we investigate whether or not RTA dummy variables 
or some fixed effects play an alternative role in place of bilateral tariff rates. As a result, 
we found that the omission of bilateral tariff rates seems not to be particularly serious in 
terms of omitted-variable biases because the coefficients for standard gravity variables 
do not change qualitatively and quantitatively between gravity equations with or 
without tariff rates. Furthermore, while RTA dummy variables cannot play an 
alternative role in place of tariff rates, the inclusion of time-invariant pair fixed effects 
in addition to the time-variant importer fixed effects and exporter fixed effects accounts 
for the omission of tariff rates because the gravity equation with those three kinds of 
fixed effects does not yield significant results in the tariff rates. In short, without data on 
bilateral tariff rates, it is recommended that the gravity equation be estimated with those 
three kinds of fixed effects.  
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Appendix: Sample Countries 
Region Country Region Country
Africa Burkina Faso Asia Bangladesh
Africa Gabon Asia Brunei Darussalam
Africa Ghana Asia China
Africa Kenya Asia Hong Kong
Africa Madagascar Asia India
Africa Malawi Asia Indonesia
Africa Mali Asia Israel
Africa Mauritius Asia Japan
Africa Morocco Asia Korea
Africa Nigeria Asia Malaysia
Africa Rwanda Asia Nepal
Africa South Africa Asia Oman
Africa Tanzania, United Rep. of Asia Pakistan
Africa Tunisia Asia Philippines
Africa Uganda Asia Saudi Arabia
Africa Zambia Asia Singapore
Africa Zimbabwe Asia Sri Lanka
America Argentina Asia Thailand
America Barbados Asia Viet Nam
America Belize Europe Belgium and Luxembourg
America Bolivia Europe Czech Republic
America Brazil Europe Denmark
America Canada Europe Estonia
America Chile Europe Finland
America Colombia Europe France
America Costa Rica Europe Germany
America Dominica Europe Greece
America Ecuador Europe Hungary
America El Salvador Europe Iceland
America Grenada Europe Ireland
America Guatemala Europe Italy
America Guyana Europe Latvia
America Honduras Europe Lithuania
America Jamaica Europe Luxembourg
America Mexico Europe Moldova, Rep.of
America Nicaragua Europe Netherlands
America Paraguay Europe Norway
America Peru Europe Poland
America Saint Kitts and Nevis Europe Portugal
America Saint Lucia Europe Romania
America Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Europe Spain
America Suriname Europe Sweden
America Trinidad and Tobago Europe Switzerland
America United States of America Europe Turkey
America Uruguay Europe Ukraine
America Venezuela Europe United Kingdom
Pacific Australia
Pacific New Zealand  
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Table 1. Tariff Rates for Manufactured Goods 
1996 2006 1996 2006 1996 2006
Africa 19 12 12 6 22 14
America 14 7 14 7 15 9
Asia 21 8 13 8 21 9
Europe 4 1 18 10 4 2
Pacific 3 0.1 15 9 5 3
Within Region (%) To Outside Region (%) From Outside Region (%)
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on World Integrated Trade System (WITS). 
Notes: The column ‘Within Region’ indicates intra-regional tariff rates. The column ‘To Outside 
Region’ reports the tariff rates applied when each region exports to the outside. The column ‘From 
Outside Region’ indicates the tariff rates applied to countries outside of each region. 
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Table 2. Basic Statistics 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Trade 77,057 15.547 3.981 0 26.429
Tariff 77,057 0.087 0.076 0 0.609
RTA1 77,057 0.257 0.437 0 1
RTA5 77,057 0.234 0.423 0 1
RTA10 77,057 0.229 0.420 0 1
CU1 77,057 0.058 0.233 0 1
FTA1 77,057 0.119 0.324 0 1
PTA1 77,057 0.122 0.327 0 1
Distance 77,057 8.717 0.872 4.394 9.892
Language 77,057 0.177 0.382 0 1
Colony 77,057 0.021 0.142 0 1
Contigency 77,057 0.024 0.154 0 1  
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Table 3. Gravity Results 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Tariff -3.828*** -2.889*** -2.813*** -4.243***
[0.367] [0.371] [0.370] [0.378]
RTA1 0.336*** 0.444***
[0.019] [0.044]
RTA5 -0.331***
[0.049]
RTA10 0.285***
[0.027]
CU1 0.812***
[0.033]
FTA1 -0.206***
[0.028]
PTA1 -0.027
[0.026]
Distance -1.613*** -1.596*** -1.512*** -1.514*** -1.532***
[0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.010] [0.011]
Language 0.724*** 0.711*** 0.701*** 0.693*** 0.688***
[0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.021]
Colony 0.810*** 0.825*** 0.869*** 0.863*** 0.900***
[0.049] [0.049] [0.049] [0.049] [0.049]
Contigency 0.127*** 0.119*** 0.105** 0.087** 0.035
[0.044] [0.044] [0.044] [0.044] [0.044]
Importer * Year YES YES YES YES YES
Exporter * Year YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 77,057 77,057 77,057 77,057 77,057
Adjusted R-sq 0.8243 0.8245 0.8252 0.8255 0.8260  
Notes: ***, **, and * show 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
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Table 4. Gravity with Time-invariant Pair Fixed Effects 
(I) (II) (III) (III)
Tariff -0.200 -0.134 0.210 -0.104
[0.342] [0.344] [0.346] [0.344]
RTA1 0.090** 0.080*
[0.045] [0.045]
RTA5 0.241***
[0.039]
RTA10 0.086***
[0.022]
CU1 0.166**
[0.065]
FTA1 0.120***
[0.045]
PTA1 -0.091
[0.136]
Importer * Year YES YES YES YES
Exporter * Year YES YES YES YES
Pair YES YES YES YES
Observations 77,057 77,057 77,057 77,057
Adjusted R-sq 0.9348 0.9348 0.9348 0.9348  
Notes: ***, **, and * show 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
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Table 5. OLS Regression of RTA Dummies on Bilateral Tariff Rates 
(I) (II) (III)
RTA1 -0.002*** -0.021***
[0.001] [0.002]
RTA5 0.013***
[0.002]
RTA10 0.011***
[0.001]
CU1 -0.023***
[0.001]
FTA1 -0.055***
[0.001]
PTA1 0.047***
[0.001]
Constant 0.095*** 0.095*** 0.096***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 96,162 96,162 96,162
Adjusted R-sq 0.0001 0.0029 0.0932  
Notes: ***, **, and * show 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
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Figure 1. Trend in the World Average of Tariff Rates for Manufactured Goods 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on World Integrated Trade System (WITS). 
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Figure 2. Ranking of the Average Tariff Rates for Manufactured Goods in 2006 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on World Integrated Trade System (WITS) 
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